Mind the Gap: Basic Health Along the ACA’s Coverage Continuum by Sanford, Sallie Thieme
Journal of Health Care Law and Policy
Volume 17
Issue 1 Symposium: Health Care Reform: The State of
the States Roundtable
Article 5
Mind the Gap: Basic Health Along the ACA’s
Coverage Continuum
Sallie Thieme Sanford
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Health Care Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sallie T. Sanford, Mind the Gap: Basic Health Along the ACA’s Coverage Continuum, 17 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 101 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol17/iss1/5
  
 
 
MIND THE GAP: 
BASIC HEALTH ALONG THE 
ACA’S COVERAGE CONTINUUM 
SALLIE THIEME SANFORD∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It will not be easy to implement the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s)1 
insurance access provisions, and implementation will not be a one-time event.  The 
ACA’s delayed Basic Health Program (BHP)2 underscores both of these points.  
This insurance affordability program was intended to be available as a state option 
in January 2014, in explicit coordination with an expanded Medicaid and the new 
insurance exchange Marketplaces.3  The BHP is designed to be a separate program 
that operates as a bridge between the two, with the goals of reducing insurance 
costs and increasing care continuity for low-income people who are ineligible for 
Medicaid and who would otherwise qualify for subsidized private insurance 
coverage through the Marketplace.4 
Because of federal regulatory delay, the program cannot start before 2015.5  
For states considering the BHP, this delay complicates what was already a 
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 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (Supp. V 
2012) (explaining basic health program option). 
 3. See Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 186,59122, 186,59127 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 600) (discussing BHP coordination with the Marketplace and 
Medicaid).  In the ACA the sites for purchasing individual private insurance plans are referred to 
as “Exchanges,” but the federal government’s information website and other popular sources now 
term them “Marketplaces.” See Health Insurance Marketplace for Individuals, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/marketplace/individual (last visited Oct.14, 2013) 
(displaying the federal government website’s use of the term “Marketplace”). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. V 2012).  See also Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 186,59123 (discussing the purpose of establishing a BHP). 
 5. See Questions and Answers: Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act, MEDICAID.GOV, 
(Feb. 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/FAQ-medicaid-and-chip-affordable-
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complicated calculus, one with significant unknowns and moving parts.  States with 
related pre-existing programs will be challenged to maintain aspects of their 
infrastructure while they consider the pros and cons of incorporating a delayed 
BHP, or related, still evolving options.6  One upside of the delay is that states will 
have preliminary data on the coverage status of those who would be served by the 
program and also on the functioning of their Marketplaces,7 and expanded 
Medicaid.8  States will have initial indications about whether and how the ACA’s 
coverage incentives are working.9 
A state’s decision whether to adopt the BHP will involve consideration of its 
impacts on low-income residents, on the state Marketplace, and on the state 
budget.10  These considerations do not involve merely technical or financial 
issues.11  They raise fundamental health care access issues that animated the BHP’s 
adoption—both as part of the ACA and in its historical form.12 
In this article, I first describe the origins of the BHP in a state program with 
parallels to the current federal reform effort.13  I then turn to the specifics of the 
 
care-act-implementation/downloads/aca-faq-bhp.pdf (announcing that BHP regulations would be 
delayed); see also Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,123 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 600) (specifying that states will have the option to establish a BHP 
beginning Jan. 1, 2015). 
 6. See infra Part IV.  
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(G) (Supp. V 2011) (explaining that there will be a periodic review 
of the benefits offered by a state’s Marketplace).  See Supporting Statement for Data Collection to 
Support Eligibility Determinations for Insurance Affordability Programs and Enrollment through 
Affordable Insurance Exchanges, Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program Agencies, 
STATE REFORUM, https://www.statereforum.org/system/files/508cms-10440_supporting_ 
statement_part_a.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (discussing the collection of data to determine 
coverage status and enroll individuals in appropriate coverage programs).  See Amanda Cassidy, 
Health Policy Brief: Basic Health Program, HEALTH AFF. 1 (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_80.pdf (discussing the 
establishment of a BHP as an additional means of expanding coverage after extending Medicaid 
and private health insurance to qualified individuals). 
 8. See STATE REFORUM, supra note 7 (stating that data must be collected to determine how 
individuals can apply for the ACA and which program is most appropriate); see also Cassidy, 
supra note 7 (stating Medicaid is set to expand in January 2014). 
 9. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18022 (Supp. V 2012)) (establishing a periodic review of the benefits offered by a state’s 
marketplace). 
 10. See Deborah Bachrach et al., Focus on Health Reform—The Role of the Basic Health 
Program in the Coverage Continuum: Opportunities, Risks, and Considerations for States, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 3, 3 (Mar. 2012), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/KFF-Role_of_BHP 
_in_Coverage_Continuum-Manatt_3.2012.pdf (discussing the advantages and risks states should 
consider when deciding whether or not to implement a BHP). 
 11. See id. at 5–8 (discussing the considerations of establishing a BHP). 
 12. See John A. Graves et al., Balancing Coverage Affordability and Continuity under a Basic 
Health Program Option, NEW ENG. J. MED. e44(1), e44(1) (2011), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1111863 (discussing the ACA’s concern for 
continuity of coverage and the option to adopt a BHP to address disruptions in coverage). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
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ACA’s provision and its context within the law’s insurance affordability 
programs.14  Finally, I consider possible questions that the program raises for 
policymakers going forward.15  Can BHP coverage be designed to be increase 
affordability and promote care continuity better than Marketplace coverage?  
Would the existence of the BHP enhance or undermine the state’s Marketplace?16  
How would the federal funding compare to the state’s costs for the program?17  
Ultimately, whether a state adopts the BHP or not, it ought to mind the gap between 
Medicaid and the Marketplace.18  When transitioning between the Medicaid and 
Marketplace insurance platforms, people can stumble.  In this transition, central 
ACA goals of affordability and continuity will be tested.19 
II. THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM’S PAST—ITS ROOTS IN  
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 
The BHP was added to the ACA in Washington, D.C., but its roots lie in the 
other Washington.20  Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Washington State legislature 
undertook a concerted effort to reduce the number of uninsured Washingtonians, 
then estimated at about 12% of the state’s population.21  Washington Basic Health 
began as a pilot project in 1988 to offer state-subsidized private health insurance to 
4,000 low-income residents of the state’s two most populous counties.22  
The legislature reauthorized and expanded the project, and then included it as 
a centerpiece of the state’s sweeping attempt at “ambitious, comprehensive health 
reform[] in the early 1990s.”23  Washington State’s 1993 Health Services Act 
(HSA)24 aimed at universal coverage, using mechanisms similar to those adopted 
 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Parts III–IV; see also Graves et al., supra note 12, at e44(3) (discussing the 
ACA’s goal of “ensuring access to stable and affordable coverage.”). 
 20. See History of Basic Health, WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., 
http://www.basichealth.hca.wa.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (discussing the origin 
of Basic Health in Washington state). 
 21. Id.  
 22. See id. (discussing Washington Basic Health as a pilot program, as well as the state’s 
establishment of a high-risk pool in efforts to reduce the number of uninsured Washingtonians); 
Health Care Access Act of 1987, ch. 5, 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 2502 (discussing the 
establishment of basic health care services for Washingtonians). 
 23. See Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in 
Washington, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 133, 133-37 (2000).  
See generally Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070, 
2073, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973 (revealing the history 
of the health care reform act in Washington). 
 24. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070, repealed 
by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973. 
	   	  
104	   JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY	   [VOL. 17:	  
nearly two decades later in the ACA.25  Washington’s HSA required most state 
residents to have health insurance, and most employers to provide it.26  The HSA 
included a phase-in of pure community rating on the individual market, ultimately 
with no price variability for age, pre-existing condition or other factors.27  
Washington Basic Health, which became permanent under the HSA,28 was a 
significant piece of this attempt at universal coverage.29  Washington Basic Health 
was to the state HSA somewhat as the health insurance Marketplaces are to the 
federal ACA.30  Individuals and families without access to employer-sponsored 
insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid, could turn to Washington Basic Health, a 
marketplace of comparable private insurance plans offering at least the statutorily 
required set of benefits, with sliding-scale state subsidies for those with incomes 
below 200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).31  Those with incomes above 
200% FPL were statutorily eligible to buy insurance on this marketplace, but 
without state subsidies.32  
 
 25. Compare id. §§ 101–102 (discussing the essential services that will be offered to 
Washingtonians that enroll in certified health plans), with Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (Supp. V 2012) (discussing the essential health benefits that will 
be offered to individuals enrolling in health plans).  
 26. See Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, §§ 463–464, 1993 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 2070, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973 (discussing 
state resident and employer participation in Washington’s HSA).  Because Washington is one of 
the few states without an income tax, the legislature could not rely on a tax penalty to enforce the 
individual mandate, unlike the federal government in the ACA.  See Income Tax, DEP’T OF 
REVENUE WASH. STATE, http://dor.wa.gov/content/findtaxesandrates/incometax/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2013) (explaining that “Washington State does not have a personal or corporate income 
tax.”).  See What’s the Penalty for Not Having Health Insurance?, EHEALTH (June 26, 2013), 
https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/affordable-care-act/faqs/how-much-are-the-tax-penalties-for-
not-having-health-insurance-and-when-do-they-apply (discussing the ACA tax penalty and how it 
is implemented).  What was to be done about employers who were required to provide insurance 
and did not or individuals who were required to have insurance and did not?  The newly created 
Washington Health Services Commission was to report back on the “reasons why individuals are 
not enrolled . . . and [make] recommendations regarding enforcement of this requirement.”  
Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 463, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070, repealed 
by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973.  
 27. See Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 453, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 
2070, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973 (discussing the 
HSA’s uniform and supplemental benefits package based on community rating).  
 28. See id. at 2075 (discussing the legislative findings on the importance of a Washington 
Basic Health).  
 29. See id.  
 30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 31. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 208, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070, 
repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973. 
 32. See id. (discussing the enrollment of subsidized and nonsubsidized individuals).  In the 
recent decade, however, unsubsidized coverage under the program has been mostly unavailable as 
insurance companies declined to participate in that portion of the market.  See History of Basic 
Health, supra note 20 (discussing a decline in nonsubsidized coverage as a result of rising costs).  
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Before this comprehensive health reform statute went into effect, however, 
the legislature gutted it.33  The legislature first repealed the contentious mandates 
(to individuals and employers)34 and then, as insurers abandoned the individual 
market, limited key consumer protections (including that people not be denied a 
policy or charged more based on pre-existing conditions).35  Changing political 
circumstances influenced this quick turnabout.  Republicans gained control in the 
state House and came within one seat in the Senate,36 while raising objections to 
what they saw as government overreaching in the health care arena.37  In addition, 
the federal government seemed unlikely to grant an ERISA waiver,38 which was 
probably necessary to enforce the employer mandates.39  Furthermore, the Clinton 
health plan,40 which had been under serious consideration in 1993, was effectively 
dead when Washington’s newly realigned legislature opened its session.41  
Washington Basic Health, however, remained.  Several other states adopted 
similar programs to cover low-income residents not eligible for Medicaid.42  
 
 33. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (tracing the evolution of Basic Health, 
which was adopted under the ACA). 
 34. Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973.  See History of Basic Health, 
supra note 20 (noting that HB 1046 repealed much of the HSA, “eliminating the minimum 
benefits package and the employer/individual mandate”).  See also Kirk, supra note 23, at 137–38 
(stating that “[i]n addition to removing the employer provisions that ran afoul of ERISA, the 
repeal had important implications for the individual market”). 
 35. See Act of March 23, 2000, ch. 79, 2000 Wash. Sess. Laws 413, 425 (regarding eligibility 
for pool coverage for those who have been denied coverage, have had restrictive riders added to 
their policy, or have up-rated premiums based on pre-existing conditions).   
 36. Kirk, supra note 23, at 137. 
 37. See Robert Cihak, et al., The Rise and Repeal of the Washington State Health 
Plan: Lessons For America's State Legislators, Heritage Found. (June 11, 1997), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1997/06/bg1121nbsp-the-rise-and-repeal-of-the-
washington (describing the “attempt to implement the Washington State plan produced a citizens' 
revolt and led to a Republican takeover of the legislature” which “repealed the reform package”). 
 38. See Kirk, supra note 23, at 137 (explaining that “Washington’s ERISA waiver prospects 
at the national level” appeared to diminish as of the fall of 1994). 
 39. See Kirk, supra note 23, at 138 (explaining that when the legislature passed legislation 
repealing parts of the HSA, it also removed “the employer provisions that ran afoul of ERISA”).  
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a complicated federal statute that, 
among many other things, “supersede[s] any and all state laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .”  ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); 
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA 
pre-empts Maryland employer-coverage requirement).  See also Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. 
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 661 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 546 F.3d 639 
(2008), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3497 (2010) (holding that ERISA does not pre-empt San Francisco 
employer-coverage requirement).  
 40. See Kirk, supra note 23, at 137–38 (describing a coalition of business groups that ran 
advertisements comparing Clinton’s “failed” health plan to the HSA). 
 41. See id. at 137–38 (noting that the “Clinton plan” did not pass). 
 42. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 16 (discussing pre-ACA state-funded programs for 
coverage of low-income adults); see also Cassidy, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that, post-ACA, 
Massachusetts and California passed initial legislation enabling a BHP, and “[s]even other states 
have passed legislation requiring an analysis of the prospect”). 
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MinnesotaCare, for example, is a prominent example, which provided subsidized 
insurance to about 130,000 of that state’s working poor in 2012.43  At its height in 
2002, Washington Basic Health insured more than 135,000 individuals.44  Under 
Washington Basic Health, private insurers bid to provide coverage; in 2012, all 
coverage was provided through managed care entities that also served the Medicaid 
population.45  Coverage specifics have changed over time.  In recent years, as the 
program’s funding was cut, Washington Basic Health recipients have seen higher 
out-of-pocket costs in the forms of deductibles, co-pays, and co-insurance.46 
State budget constraints significantly limited the number of enrollees.  In 
2012, 35,000 individuals had Washington Basic Health coverage, and 166,000 
more were on a waitlist.47  This is a fraction—though not an insignificant fraction—
of the one million state residents without any insurance in 2012.48  The percentage 
of residents without health insurance at that point was a bit higher than when the 
state piloted Washington Basic Health decades before.49  Leading up to 2014, 
Washington Basic Health and other similar state programs received federal funds 
under a Medicaid transitional bridge waiver,50 an explicit recognition that many of 
those in the program would be eligible for Medicaid in 2014.  
 
 43. See MinnesotaCare, MINN. DEP’T. OF HUMAN SERVS., http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/ 
idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestRelease
d&dDocName=id_006255 (last visited June 25, 2013) (stating that “[t]he program served an 
average of 129,000 people each month in state fiscal year 2012.”). 
 44. Washington State Proposal for a Federal Basic Health Option, WASH. STATE HEALTH 
CARE AUTH. 1, 2 (2012), available at www.hca.wa.gov/hcr/me/documents/WA_State_BHPO_ 
Proposal_2012_06.pdf [hereinafter HCA Proposal]; see also More Washingtonians wait-listed for 
Basic Health as employers cut coverage, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.eoionline.org/blog/more-washingtonians-wait-listed-for-basic-health-as-employers-
cut-coverage/ (stating that enrollment for Washington’s Basic Health was at “a high of 135,000 in 
2002.”).  
 45. HCA Proposal, supra note 44, at 8 (describing how contracts were awarded to five 
managed care organizations to offer coverage to enrollees of Medicaid and Washington Basic 
Health whose coverage started on July 2012).  
 46. See History of Basic Health, supra note 20 (explaining that the average co-insurance and 
co-pays for enrollees increased from the 2009 average of $34 per month to $60 per month in 2010, 
and that the annual deductible increased from $150 to $250 in 2010). 
 47. See HCA Proposal, supra note 44, at 2 (explaining the waitlist as a result of an enrollment 
freeze caused by budget cuts). 
 48. Mike Kreidler, State of the Uninsured Health Coverage in Washington State Costs, 
Trends and Projections 2008 to 2014, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R 1, 1  (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/about-oic/commissioner-reports/documents/2011-uninsured-
report.pdf (stating that “[r]oughly 1 million Washingtonians—14.5 percent—now have no health 
insurance” going into 2012). 
 49. Compare History of Basic Health, supra note 20 (estimating that 12% to 14% of 
Washington residents were uninsured in 1986 when Washington Basic Health was piloted) with 
Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2013), 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ (estimating the current percentage of 
uninsured Washington residents at 14%). 
 50. See History of Basic Health, supra note 20 (explaining that the waiver provided an 
estimated $7.7 million per month in federal funds in 2011, covering about 40% of the cost of 
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III. THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM’S PRESENT—AN                                                
ACA PROVISION WITH KEY UNKNOWNS 
Citing her state’s experience, United States Senator Maria Cantwell of 
Washington successfully offered the BHP option as an amendment to legislation 
that became the ACA.51  Within the ACA, the BHP is located at 42 U.S.C. § 
18051.52  Section 18051 falls, actually and symbolically, between the ACA 
provisions for the new Marketplaces53 and expanded Medicaid.54  The BHP is 
indelibly intertwined with these two key access provisions. 
As drafted, the ACA presumed that in January 2014 all states would expand 
their Medicaid populations, but the Supreme Court’s June 2012 decision makes this 
a state option.55  In states that take this option—the “expansion states”—Medicaid 
programs would be expanded to cover all citizens and immigrants with five years’ 
legal residency who are under age sixty-five and have incomes under 138% FPL.56  
Because Medicaid otherwise targets categories of low-income people (primarily 
those over sixty-five or with qualifying disabilities, children, and pregnant women) 
this expansion effectively means Medicaid eligibility for many more low-income 
working adults, who would not otherwise be eligible no matter how low their 
 
Washington Basic Health and Disability Lifeline, a separate state program for uninsured people 
with qualifying disabilities). 
 51. See Press Release, Senator Maria Cantwell, Health Care Reform Bill Includes Major 
Cantwell Initiatives to Control Costs, Improve Quality of Care (Oct. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=318903 (stating that “the [Senate Finance] 
Committee approved a Cantwell amendment that would establish a nation-wide version of 
Washington state’s Basic Health system”).  
 52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (Supp. V 2012).  
 53. See id. § 18051(a)(1) (offering through Basic Health at least the “essential health benefits” 
in 18022(b) “in lieu of offering such individuals coverage through an Exchange”); see also id. § 
18031(a)(1) (establishing the Marketplaces). 
 54. See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012) (expanding Medicaid to 
individuals under sixty-five years old who are not pregnant, but whose incomes do not exceed 
133% of the poverty line). 
 55. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (holding that 
Medicaid expansion “is unconstitutional when applied to withdraw existing Medicaid funds from 
States that decline to comply with the expansion”); see also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into 
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 87 (2013) (criticizing the Medicaid ruling for “missteps” that resulted 
from “factual inaccuracies promulgated by the Court”).  
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (Supp. V 2012); see also Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2008) (stating “an alien who is a 
qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal means-tested public benefit for a period of 5 
years beginning on the date of the alien's entry into the United States with a status within the 
meaning of the term ‘qualified alien’”).   The ACA expansion threshold is 133% FPL, but the 
statute specifies that 5% of an individual’s income is to be disregarded, effectively raising it to 
138% FPL.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(I) (Supp. V 2012). 
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income.57  Just how many more depends significantly on how many states, and 
which states, expand their programs. 
The Marketplaces are the other primary means that the ACA aims to 
significantly increase the number of people with health insurance coverage.58  The 
Marketplaces will offer private insurance plans—known as “qualified health plans” 
(QHPs)—that provide at least the “essential health benefits,” and meet other 
criteria.59  Plans will be offered at four “metal levels”—bronze, silver, gold and 
platinum—with progressively higher actuarial values such that bronze plans would 
have the lowest premiums but correspondingly higher expected out-of-pocket costs 
(up to the standard out-of-pocket limit).60  
A crucial aspect of these Marketplaces (and a large part of the cost to the 
federal government) is their function as a vehicle for federal advance premium tax 
credits to support insurance purchase.61  These tax credits are effectively subsidies 
that are available to citizens and people with at least five years’ legal residency in 
the United States who are not eligible for Medicaid, do not have adequate, 
affordable employer-sponsored insurance, and have incomes that are between 
100%62 and 400% FPL.63  These sliding scale subsidies are pegged to the premium 
 
 57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(10)(A) (granting  “medical assistance” in the form of payment 
of part or all of the costs for medical care and services for those over sixty-five or with qualifying 
disabilities, children, and pregnant women); see also Medicaid and the Uninsured, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. 1, 1 (Mar. 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2013/04/7993-03.pdf (stating that prior to the ACA, state Medicaid programs could only cover 
non-disabled adults without dependent children by obtaining a waiver or through the state’s own 
funding because federal Medicaid matching funds were not available to states covering that 
population of adults ). 
 58. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Exchanges, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2010), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/ 
7908-02.pdf (explaining that the purpose of the Marketplaces is to make the purchase of health 
insurance easier and more affordable for individuals and small businesses that do not have access 
to employer or public health coverage). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1) (defining “qualified health plan”); id. § 18022(b) (listing the 
minimum benefits, general categories, items, and services covered under the “essential health 
benefits package”). 
 60. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d) (setting out the bronze, silver, gold and platinum levels of 
coverage with the percentage of actuarial values). 
 61. See I.R.C. § 36B(a) (Supp. V 2012) (stating that “there shall be allowed as a credit against 
the tax imposed by this subtitle for any taxable year an amount equal to the premium assistance 
credit amount of the taxpayer for the taxable year”). 
 62. See Dylan Scott, The Story Behind the Biggest Mistake in Obamacare, GOVERNING 
FEDWATCH (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/gov-obamacare-
mistake.html (arguing that the fact that the subsidy eligibility begins at 100% FPL rather than at 
138% FPL (the Medicaid expansion level) may simply be a drafting error).  If it is a drafting error, 
it is one that would have been of limited consequence but for the Supreme Court’s decision.  Id.  
Those who are Medicaid eligible are ineligible for subsidies; thus the subsidies effectively begin 
at 138% FPL in expansion states.  Id.  That subsidies begin instead at 100% FPL in non-expansion 
states has at least a couple of consequences.  One is that federal costs for subsidies might be 
higher (though offset by reduced federal Medicaid costs).  Another is the possibility of a Medicaid 
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price of the second least expensive silver plan.64  Cost-sharing subsidies (to reduce 
the financial burden of deductibles, co-pays, and co-insurance) are also available to 
purchasers with incomes between 100% and 250% FPL.65  Subsidies are not 
available to those with incomes below 100% FPL.66  In a non-expansion state, then, 
many low-income, non-disabled, non-pregnant adult citizens will be ineligible for 
Medicaid and also ineligible for subsidized private insurance.67   
The BHP would operate as a separate state-run program between the 
subsidized Marketplace and expanded Medicaid.68  It is intended to be another of 
the “insurance affordability programs,” in common with these two and the Child 
Health Insurance Program.69 
 
“premium assistance” or “private option” arrangement as discussed infra text accompanying note 
71.  Id.  
 63. See id. (stating that those with an income between 100–400% of the FPL  qualify for 
federal tax subsidies under this law). 
 64. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2) (explaining that premium assistance may be the excess of “the 
adjusted monthly premium for such month for the applicable second lowest cost silver plan”).  
 65. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(2) (Supp. V 2012) 
(stating the income levels for reduced cost sharing under the plan). 
 66. See id. at § 18071(c)(1)(A) (listing all income levels that qualify for cost sharing 
subsidies, which are all above the 100% FPL). 
 67. See The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 7 (Oct. 2012), available at  http://theadvocate.com/csp/mediapool/ 
sites/dt.common.streams.StreamServer.cls?STREAMOID=bK8_JxfGnfcXzTSDxu0$JZM5tm0Zx
rvol3sywaAHBAkhdfIFiD9VMoMYJ7v66u_FE0$uXvBjavsllACLNr6VhLEUIm2tympBeeq1Fw
i7sIigrCfKm_F3DhYfWov3omce$8CAqP1xDAFoSAgEcS6kSQ--
&CONTENTTYPE=application/pdf&CONTENTDISPOSITION=Kaiser%20Commission%20Co
verage%20Gap%20October%202013.pdf [hereinafter The Coverage Gap] (stating that many 
states opting out of Medicaid expansion leave millions of low-income adults uninsured because 
they “will remain outside the reach of the ACA,” do not have employer-sponsored coverage, are 
not eligible for state-assisted coverage, and even those eligible to purchase coverage on the 
Marketplaces may be ineligible for the premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies”—thus the 
insurance premium costs for low-income people in the coverage gap are “likely prohibitively 
expensive”). 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1)–(e)(1)(A) (stating that a BHP may be established to provide 
health benefits “to eligible individuals” in lieu of offering such individuals coverage through an 
Exchange,” and an eligible individual “is not eligible to enroll in the State’s [M]edicaid 
program”). 
 69. See id. § 18051 (Supp. V 2012) (giving states “flexibility to establish basic health 
programs for low-income individuals not eligible for [M]edicaid”).  CHIP has for many years 
allowed states to cover with enhanced matching federal dollars children and some parents in 
households with incomes above traditional Medicaid limits.  See State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP): Reauthorization History, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 2009), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7743-02.pdf (stating that CHIP was 
enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to expand eligibility levels and simplify enrollment 
procedures).  See generally CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397ee(b)–ll (Supp. 
V 2012). 
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One of the BHP’s goals is to address issues of affordability.70  An 
“affordability cliff” will exist between Medicaid, which has few out-of-pocket 
costs, and the Marketplace, in which people just over the Medicaid cut-off will 
have higher cost-sharing and also may pay premiums that, after subsidies, can 
amount to as much as 3% of their income71—a relatively high amount for low-
income individuals and families.  This is a highly price-sensitive population with 
high rates of uninsurance.72  Low-income people, particularly healthy low-income 
people, might find even the subsidized rates too high, and thus decline coverage.73  
Another goal is to reduce churn and its impacts.74  “Churn” is shorthand for 
continuity of care and administrative disruptions that arise when people transition 
back and forth between insurance platforms as their income or family composition 
changes.75  Income fluctuations are common among those with low-wage jobs, and 
private insurance often comes with different physician and clinic networks than 
does Medicaid.76   
The BHP allows states to use federal funds to craft a separate, state-run 
program of private insurance for residents with incomes below 200% FPL who are 
ineligible for Medicaid and who would otherwise qualify for subsidized coverage 
through the Marketplace.77  The state would contract with one or more managed 
care plans to offer BHP coverage.78  The amount of federal funds provided to the 
 
 70. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 17 (stating that the overall intent of the BHP is to be 
more affordable to consumers). 
 71. See Ann Hwang et al., Creation of State Basic Health Programs Would Lead to 4 Percent 
Fewer People Churning Between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1314, 1314 (2012), 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/6/1314.full.html (explaining that “a high 
proportion of people with low incomes will experience frequent shifts in eligibility between 
Medicaid and state insurance exchanges”); see also Subsidy Calculator Premium Assistance for 
Coverage in Exchanges, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 2013), available at 
http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/#state=&zip=&income-type=dollars&income=33000 
&employer-coverage=0&people=4&alternate-plan-family=individual&adult-count=2&adults% 
5B0%5D%5Bage%5D=21&adults%5B0%5D%5Btobacco%5D=0&adults%5B1%5D%5Bage%5
D=21&adults%5B1%5D%5Btobacco%5D=0&child-count=2&child-tobacco=0 (estimating that 
Marketplace premiums for those just over the 138% Medicaid cut-off can amount to up to 3.35% 
of their income). 
 72. See Hwang et al., supra note 71, at 1314–18 (stating that affordability of coverage to 
enrollees in the Marketplace  may be affected by “a disrupted source of financial subsidy, [which] 
may lead to breaks in coverage” and when “recouping tax credit overpayments, [which] might 
occur if people receiving coverage through an exchange experience a rise in income during the 
course of the year, because they will then be required to repay any excess tax credits that they 
received”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,140 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R pt. 600) (discussing the issue of churn). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e) (Supp. V 2012) 
(defining “eligible individual”).   
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1) (Supp. V 2012). 
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state for the BHP would be tied to subsidies the federal government would have 
spent on the covered population had it remained in the Marketplace.79   
Thus, the amount of funding for the program is quite linked to the premiums 
and cost sharing associated with plans on the Marketplaces.  States that choose this 
option are to receive 95% of what the federal government would have spent on 
premium subsidies,80 and 95% or 100% (the ACA is not entirely clear) of what the 
federal government would have spent on cost-sharing subsidies.81  There are 
significant financial calculation questions not addressed in the statute that will 
presumably be clarified in the delayed BHP regulations.  These relate to details 
such as risk adjustments, financial support for program administration costs, and 
the logistics of end-of-year reconciliation.82 
The federal funds are to be used to “reduce the premiums and cost-sharing of 
or to provide additional benefits to” BHP enrollees.83  If the state has a BHP, 
people who are eligible for it would not be allowed to purchase subsidized 
Marketplace insurance.84  They would instead be eligible for the BHP.85  BHP 
benefits must be at least as comprehensive as those required to be offered on the 
Marketplace.86  The ACA specifies that the BHP is to be coordinated with 
Medicaid and other state-administered health programs “to maximize the efficiency 
of such programs and to improve the continuity of care.”87  The expectation is that 
the state would craft coverage that adopts benefit design and other system features 
similar to that provided in the state’s Medicaid managed care program, thus 
reducing the impact of churn around the 138% FPL income level.88   
If an expansion state adopts the BHP, that program becomes a key part of the 
coverage continuum for those without employer-provided insurance or Medicare.89  
It would have a particularly prominent role for adult citizens: those below 138% 
FPL would be covered by Medicaid;90 then up until 200% FPL by the BHP;91 from 
 
 79. Id. at § 18051(d)(3)(A)(i).  
 80. Id. 
 81. See infra note 160. 
 82. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 1 (discussing “significant questions and challenges” 
involved with the implementation of the BHP). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(d)(2) (Supp. V 2012). 
 84. Id. at § 18051(e)(2). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at § 18051(a)(2)(B). 
 87. Id. at § 18051(c)(4). 
 88. See Cassidy, supra note 7, at 2–3 (discussing the BHP’s ability to eliminate churning 
between Medicaid and Marketplace plans “for those below 200 percent of the poverty” level). 
 89. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3–4 (discussing the continuum of coverage and 
benefits of the BHP for those who do not have employer provided insurance or qualify for 
Medicaid). 
 90. See Subsidy Calculator, supra note 71 (noting that “states have the option to expand 
Medicaid eligibility to all people with incomes below 138% of the poverty level.”).  
 91. Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3 
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that level to 400% FPL by Marketplace insurance with sliding-scale federal 
subsidies;92 and at higher incomes by Marketplace insurance without subsidies.93  
Particularly in light of this coverage continuum, impacts of the BHP cannot be 
considered in isolation.   
Key issues and options are discussed in more detail in the following section of 
this article.94  Suffice it to say here that interested states would have a very difficult 
time deciding whether to incorporate the BHP into their Marketplace modeling 
without knowing how the program would be regulated and funded.  Washington 
State expressed strong interest in transitioning its state Basic Health program to an 
ACA-authorized BHP, formally requested federal guidance in early 2012, and 
submitted a proposed framework in June 2012.95  Several other states, notably 
including Minnesota, California, and Massachusetts also actively considered 
adopting the BHP, pending federal guidance.96  
On February 6, 2013, the Administration issued “sub-regulatory guidance”97 
announcing that the program’s rollout would be delayed until 2015.98  This 
document, technically a “Frequently Asked Questions” missive, promised that the 
proposed rules would issue in 2013, with final rules to follow in 2014 “so that the 
program will be operational beginning in 2015 for states interested in pursuing this 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94. See infra Part IV. 
 95. See generally Washington State Health Care Authority, Washington State Proposal for a 
Federal Basic Health Option (June 18, 2012), http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/HRI/ 
Documents/July%202012/BHPO%20Proposal%20June%2018.pdf (explaining a proposed 
framework to establish a BHP and seeking federal guidance). 
 96. See Cassidy, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that “Washington, Massachusetts and California 
are taking steps to implement a Basic Health Program” while others are awaiting federal 
clarifications on “specific details of the program.”); see also Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3 
n.1 (“At the time of this writing, analyses of BHP have been published for the following states: 
California (two studies), Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee.”).  Other states involved in 2013 BHP learning collaborative included 
Oregon, New York, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia.  See MEDICAID AND CHIP MAC 
LEARNING COLLABORATIVES, BHP ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT LEARNING COLLABORATIVE 
(PowerPoint Slides from virtual meeting May 6, 2012) (on file with the author). 
 97. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Basic Health Program and Federal 
Medicaid Matching Rates, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/07/implementing-health-reform-the-basic-health-program-
and-federal-medicaid-matching-rates/ (discussing the HHS submission of two subregulatory 
guidance documents: 1) “Notice to Establish a New System Records” and, 2) “Questions and 
Answers: Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act”); see also Mary Whisner, Some Guidance About 
Federal Agencies and Guidance, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 385, 392 (2013) (discussing sub-regulatory 
guidance as a tool of administrative law). 
 98. Medicaid and CHIP FAQs: The Basic Health Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/State-Resource-Center/FAQ-Medicaid-
and-CHIP-Affordable-Care-Act-Implementation/Downloads/FAQs-by-Topic-BHP.pdf  
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option.”99  During a February 14, 2013 Senate hearing, Senator Cantwell criticized 
the Administration for failing to issue timely regulations and for thus in effect 
“taking pages out of the law.”100  Proposed rules published on September 25, 2013 
reiterate that interested states may establish a BHP effective January 1, 2015.101 
The BHP has certainly suffered from the increasing complexity of ACA 
implementation.  State-level opposition to the ACA has made an already complex 
endeavor much more so.102  Many states will not expand Medicaid in 2014, and this 
includes states with a high percentage of citizens below 138% FPL.103  More than 
thirty states will not run their own Marketplaces in 2014 but will instead default to 
federal operation or a partnership model, a situation the statute and its funding do 
not smoothly accommodate.104  At the federal level, the continued drumbeat for 
repeal105 hinders attempts at even technical corrections, much less statutory 
refinements, or appropriation amendments.106  
 
 99. Id.; see also Phil Galewitz, HHS Delays Basic Health Plan Option Until 2015, THE 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/?p=16689 
(discussing the delay of the Basic Health Plan Option until 2015). 
 100. Phil Galewitz, Valentine’s Day Surprise: Senate Democrats Blast Obamacare 
Implementation, THE KAISER HEALTH NEWS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2013), http://capsules. 
kaiserhealthnews.org/?p=16879 (quoting Sens. Maria Cantwell, criticizing the administration for 
failing to meet a 2014 deadline to start a BHP, “[y]ou are overwhelmed by the details and 
technology, I get that point. . . . It seems as if the agency is taking pages out of the law.”). 
 101. Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,123 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600). 
 102. See Michael Cannon, The Obstacle is That Americans Don’t Want It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/29/is-obamacare-too-complicated-to-
succeed/americans-dont-want-obamacare.   
 103. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, as of September 20, 2013, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-
medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/#map (last visited July 1, 2013) (listing state decisions in 
expanding Medicaid and running their Marketplaces).   
 104. See State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Exchanges, as of May 28, 2013, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-
exchanges/#map (last visited July 1, 2013) (listing state decisions in creating health insurance 
exchanges).  Oklahoma brought one of several lawsuits challenging the authority of the federal 
government to provide subsidies as to insurance purchased through federally run Marketplaces.  
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV–11–30–
RAW, 2013 WL 405610, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2012).  Among other complications, funds 
for outreach to explain this new insurance purchasing arrangement were significantly linked to 
funding for state establishment of its marketplace, and Health and Human Services Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius faced congressional questioning about solicitation of private funds to inform 
people about the Marketplaces.  See Robert Pear, Cabinet Secretary Solicits Large Donations to 
Publicize Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/us/ 
politics/health-secretary-raises-funds-for-health-care-law.html (discussing Sebelius’ fundraising 
efforts to “ensure the success of President Obama’s health care law” and questions from the 
Senate health committee regarding the legality of these efforts). 
 105. See Robert Pear, House Votes to Delay Two Requirements of the Health Care Overhaul, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/us/politics/house-votes-to-delay-
two-requirements-of-health-care-overhaul.html?_r=0 (noting that “[s]ince early 2011, the House 
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Citing the complexity of the implementation challenges, the Obama 
Administration delayed enforcement of the employer mandate until 2015107 and 
delayed adoption of some features of the small business insurance Marketplaces.108  
In addition, the Administration issued a torrent of ACA regulations on all manner 
of ACA provisions besides those relating to insurance access.109  Members of 
Congress expressed concern that Marketplace and Medicaid rollouts will lead to a 
“train wreck.”110  Amidst all these implementation challenges, regulatory 
obligations, and political realities there seems now to be a focus on “getting the 
lights on,” on getting the essential aspects of the Marketplaces and expanded 
Medicaid up and running.111  Left to a later day are less essential provisions and 
potential refinements, including the BHP.112 
 
has voted more than 35 times to repeal all or part of the law, to scale it back, or to cut financing 
for its operation.”). 
 106. See Jonathan Weisman & Robert Pear, Partisan Gridlock Thwarts Effort to Alter Health 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/us/politics/polarized-
congress-thwarts-changes-to-health-care-law.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the lack of needed 
changes to the ACA due to a “polarized Congress.”). 
 107. Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY (July 2, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/pages/continuing-to-
implement-the-aca-in-a-careful-thoughtful-manner-.aspx (reporting that “[t]he Administration is 
announcing that it will provide an additional year before the ACA mandatory employer and 
insurer reporting requirements begin.”). 
 108. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans; Small Business Health Options Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,553, 15,554 
(proposed Mar. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–156) (stating the purpose of 
proposed rule was to provide additional time for small business owners to prepare for employee 
choice model and increase stability of small group market). 
 109. See Major ACA Regulations Issued by Agencies, ANCOR (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.ancor.org/newsroom/news/major-aca-regulations-issued-agencies (stating that on 
Friday, March 1, 2013 alone, five regulation were issued by government agencies regarding ACA 
provisions). 
 110. See Robert Pear, Democratic Senators Tell White House of Concerns About Health Care 
Law Rollout, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/us/politics/ 
democratic-senators-tell-white-house-of-concerns-about-health-care-law-rollout.html (quoting 
Senator Max Baucas, Democrat of Montana and chairman of the Finance Committee about 
concerns of White House rollout of health care law, “I just see a huge train wreck coming down”). 
 111. See Jeffrey Young, Obamacare Health Insurance Exchanges will be Open On Time: 
Official, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2013,), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/ 
obamacare-exchanges_n_3984375.html (stating that the Marketplaces were cornerstone of 
President Obama’s health care reform law, and that the administration never wavered from the 
October 1, 2013 implementation date); see also Jeffrey Young, Medicaid Expansion: States Must 
Meet Obamacare Standards if They Want to Get Full Federal Funding, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 
10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/10/medicaid-expansion-obamacare_n_ 
2272151.html (stating the Obama administration’s decision that states must meet full Medicaid 
expansion criteria before being eligible to receive full ACA funding). 
 112. See Galewitz, supra note 99 (stating the Obama administration has delayed the rollout of 
the BHP because “it basically ran out of time to put out guidelines to get the program running by 
2014” and that Health and Human Services will work to have the program available by 2015). 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF BASIC HEALTH COVERAGE—QUESTIONS AND OPTIONS 
In deciding whether to incorporate the delayed BHP or a related option into 
the state insurance coverage continuum in the coming years, states face several 
challenging questions.  BHP regulations will shape their analyses but are unlikely 
to provide definitive answers.  That is because the answers, definitive and not, are 
quite tied to the functioning of Medicaid and the Marketplace, and to the 
characteristics of those who might fall into a coverage gap between the two.113  A 
March 2012 report by the Kaiser Family Foundation114 and a November 2012 
Health Policy Brief published in Health Affairs,115 among other resources, provide 
overviews of key considerations in any state.  In addition, there are several reports 
that analyze the particulars as to specific states.116  The following highlights a few 
of the key questions, particularly in light of the regulatory delay, and of evolving 
options.  
A.  Can a BHP be Designed to Make Coverage More Affordable                  
and Enhance Continuity of Coverage? 
The potential to make coverage more affordable for low-income people drives 
much of the interest in the BHP:117   
Populations at the low end of the [Marketplace subsidy] scale face 
what has been described as an affordability cliff: while those with 
incomes under 139% FPL have no or minimal premium or cost-
sharing obligations under Medicaid, those with incomes just above 
139% FPL will be obligated to contribute approximately 3.3% of their 
 
 113. See Analysis of the Basic Health Program, MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL 
HYGIENE 9 (Jan. 17, 2012), http://dhmh.maryland.gov/docs/BHP%2001%2018%2012%20Report 
%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf (reporting a primary policy justification for BHPs is reducing 
number of individuals forced to enroll in different insurance plans as they move between 
Medicaid and Marketplace plans).  Furthermore, the analysis reports the lack of provider and 
benefit continuity for transitioning between Medicaid and Marketplace plans prompted the review 
of the BHP.  Id. 
 114. Bachrach et al., supra note 10.  
 115. Cassidy, supra note 7, at 4–6.  
 116. See, e.g., Matthew Buettgens & Caitlin Carroll, The ACA Basic Health Program in 
Washington State, URBAN INST. (Aug. 2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412572-The-
ACA-Basic-Health-Program-in-Washington-State.pdf (reporting the financial and enrollment 
estimates of a BHP in Washington State ); see also Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3 (noting the 
number of states that have conducted a state-specific BHP study). 
 117. See Rosemarie Day et al., Reform Center Health Intelligence: The Basic Health Plan—An 
Emerging Option for States, MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM 1 (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://healthreform.mckinsey.com/~/media/Extranets/Health%20System%20Reform/Intels/Health
%20Intel%20Basic%20Health%20Plan_032411.ashx (reporting that many states are likely to give 
the BHP consideration because it offers a more affordable alternative for providing health care to 
individuals with low incomes, and would allow states to provide coverage for individuals between 
138% and 200% of the FPL). 
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income, or about $45 per month for subsidized coverage through the 
[Marketplace], not including additional out-of-pocket costs that could 
run as high as $174 per month.118  
The premise behind the program is that with the state as an active purchaser, 
premiums and cost-sharing would be reduced and/or benefits increased as required 
by the provision.119  
In addition, unlike people in Marketplace plans, people in a BHP would not 
face the financial risk of owing the federal government subsidy money if their 
incomes went up and a year-end reconciliation showed that they received too much 
in health insurance subsidies.120  It is possible, though, that a state might be able to 
design its BHP to impose some kind of financial recoupment for people whose 
incomes rise while in the program.  Lower out-of-pocket expenses and freedom 
from the possibility of end-of-year reconciliation obligations should make BHP 
coverage more affordable than Marketplace coverage and thus encourage eligible 
people to enroll, though of course this depends somewhat on where the 
Marketplace rates settle.121   
B. Can a BHP Reduce Churn? 
Reducing churn and its associated problems are other key goals of the BHP 
option.122  Wage fluctuations and shifts in family composition can cause a family, 
 
 118. Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 5. 
 119. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(c)(1) (Supp. V 2012) 
(stating States shall establish competitive processes, to include negotiations of cost-sharing and 
premiums, as well as, the negotiation of any benefits additional to the basic health benefits 
described in § 18022(b), for contracting with standard health plans); see also Premium and Cost-
Sharing Subsidies in the Affordable Care Act, CMTY. CATALYST 1 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc_store/publications/Affordability_in_ACA.pdf  (stating 
premium tax credits available through the ACA will lower the cost of premiums and cost-sharing 
costs). 
 120. Basic Health Program Report, INS. DIV. DEP’T OF COM. AND CONSUMER AFF. ST. OF 
HAW. 5 (Feb. 2013), http://hawaii.gov/dcca/ins/reports/Basic_Health_Program_Final_Report.pdf 
(stating that in a BHP there is no risk of enrollees owing money back to the government due to 
differences between beginning of the year estimations and enrollees actual incomes at the end of 
the year); see also Julia James, Health Policy Brief: Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH AFF. 3 (Aug. 
1, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_97.pdf (stating 
that in a marketplace subsidy plan, if an income changes from what was used for estimation, the 
amount difference will either be refunded or owed to the government). 
 121. See Basic Health Plan Could Provide Nearly Half a Million New Yorkers with More 
Affordable Insurance, N.Y. ST. HEALTH FOUND. (June 30, 2011), http://nyshealthfoundation.org/ 
news-events/news/basic-health-plan-could-provide-nearly-half-a-million-new-yorkers-with-more 
(discussing possible cost impacts on individuals of a BHP compared to Marketplace plans). 
 122. See Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,140 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600) (discussing  income variability that “can result in individuals 
moving back and forth between Medicaid and an Exchange, a phenomenon known as ‘churning’”, 
and how the BHP could reduce churn). 
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or members of a family, to move back and forth between coverage within 
Medicaid, the BHP if it exists, and the Marketplace.123  Transitioning from one type 
of coverage to another can be disruptive, sometimes forcing people to change 
physicians, clinics, or medications, and thus leading to gaps in coverage.124  “It has 
been estimated that, once coverage is expanded in 2014, within six months of 
enrollment, more than one-third of all low-income adults—about 28 million 
people—may experience enough of a change in income to churn between Medicaid 
and [the Marketplace].”125  
If the BHP is structured similarly to Medicaid plans, with similar provider 
networks and other design features, churn should decrease at the 138% FPL 
level.126  The ACA specifically requires coordinating the BHP with Medicaid and 
other state-administered health programs.127 For reasons of continuity as well as 
cost, states are likely to look to existing Medicaid managed care plans.128  That then 
raises a related concern about the rates to be offered to health care providers.  If 
they are closer to Medicaid rates than private insurance rates, that fact might 
dissuade providers from signing up, limiting networks and making the plans less 
desirable.129 
It is possible that a BHP could increase overall churn, though perhaps without 
as significant deleterious effects as would exist without the BHP.  Increased overall 
 
 123. See Matthew Buettgens et al., Churning Under the ACA and the State Policy Options for 
Mitigation: Timely Analysis of Intermediate Health Policy Issue, URBAN INST. 7 (June 2012), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412587-Churning-Under-the-ACA-and-State-Policy-
Options-for-Mitigation.pdf (reporting that many individuals move in and out of Medicaid and 
across coverage plans due to fluctuations in their hours or wages); Cassidy, supra note 7, at 2 
(stating that family size changes through the birth of a child may change the family’s relation to 
the poverty level, and further lead the family to moving to a different type of insurance coverage, 
or gaining or losing federal subsidies). 
 124. Cassidy, supra note 7, at 2. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See John A. Graves et al., Balancing Coverage Affordability and Continuity under a Basic 
Health Program Option, 365 NEW ENGL. J. MED. e44(1), e44(3) (2011) (stating that the BHP 
would reduce churn at the 138% FPL level). 
 127. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(c)(4) (Supp. V 2012) 
(stating that “[a] State shall seek to coordinate the administration of, and provision of benefits 
under, its program under this section with the State Medicaid program under title XIX of the 
Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.], the State child health plan under title XXI of such 
Act [42 U.S.C. 1397aa et seq.], and other State-administered health programs to maximize the 
efficiency of such programs and to improve the continuity of care.”). 
 128. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 6 (stating that states are likely to look at Medicaid 
managed care plans as useful delivery system for BHP, due largely to Medicaid managed care 
plans existing infrastructure and low capitation rates). 
 129. See id. at 7 (noting that Medicaid reimbursement rates in most states are typically lower 
that the providers receive from commercial reimbursement rates, resulting in questionable ability 
of Medicaid to sustain a robust network of providers).  Id.  If BHP reimbursement rates closely 
mirror Medicaid rates, the BHP may have a similar problem with attracting and sustaining 
providers. BHP may need to enhance plan premiums in order to raise provider reimbursement 
rates.  Id.   
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churn could occur for two reasons.  First, by adding in another program along the 
coverage continuum, there would be more potential transition points.130  Second, 
the “affordability cliff” would be pushed to the 200% FPL level, the point at which 
people would shift between the BHP and the Marketplace.131  A 2011 study 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that a BHP would 
likely reduce churning at the 138% FPL level but that overall churn would be 
increased because of the new “affordability cliff” at 200% FPL.132  
Other studies predict that overall churning would decrease if states had a BHP 
and posit that churn might be less of a problem at the higher level, where people are 
more likely to have some financial reserves and a higher likelihood of employer-
sponsored coverage.133  Strategies to mitigate upper-level churn include variable 
cost-sharing within the BHP (turning the affordability cliff into a slope) and 
attention to coordination with provider networks.134  If the BHP is to serve as a 
bridge between Medicaid and the Marketplace, it is crucially important to address 
continuity of care at both transition points.   
C. Would a BHP Enhance or Undermine the Viability of the Marketplace? 
In a state that adopts the BHP, the ACA requires that all those eligible obtain 
insurance coverage through that vehicle, thus removing many people from the 
Marketplace.135  In terms of the expected impact on the Marketplace, questions 
 
 130. Graves et al., supra note at 126, at e44(3) (analyzing different data models that 
demonstrate operating a health care system with Medicaid, BHP, and Marketplace plan would 
increase churn).  Under a three-program model  44% of all eligible adults remain eligible for their 
initial program after one year, and  33% remain eligible for their initial program after two years.  
Id.  Conversely, under the baseline ACA model, 63% remain eligible for their initial program after 
one year and 49% after two years.  Id. 
 131. Id. at e44(2) (reporting that introducing a new BHP would likely lead to “coverage 
disruption when moving above or below 200% of the poverty level”). 
 132. Id. at e44(3) (finding that under a BHP, “churning” would decrease at the 138% FPL, 
however that decrease would be more than offset by the increase in churning at 200% FPL). 
 133. See Bachrach et al., supra note at 10, at 6 (stating that while any loss in continuity of 
coverage is troubling, the loss can be better absorbed by those in higher income brackets because 
they have increased access to resources and can better manage affordability cliffs); Ann Hwang, et 
al., Creation of State Basic Health Program would lead to 4 Percent Fewer People Churning 
Between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1314, 1317 (2012), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/6/1314.full.pdf+html (finding that the BHP would 
reduce churn for low income adults). 
 134. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 5–6 (discussing churn and delivery system options 
to reduce its impacts).  
 135. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e)(2) (Supp. V 2012) 
(stating that all eligible individuals will not be treated as a qualified individual eligible for 
enrollment in a qualified health plan offered through a Marketplace and all eligible individuals 
must enroll with the state-offered BHP). 
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include not just the number of people involved but also their risk profile.136  As the 
Kaiser report notes, “[t]he risk profile of the BHP eligible population will affect the 
premiums in the [Marketplace], driving them up if the BHP population is healthier 
than those remaining in the [Marketplace] or lowering the premiums if the BHP 
population is sicker.”137  And the premium costs impact the level of funding for the 
BHP.138  It all interrelates. 
Studies estimate that the BHP would reduce the number of individuals 
covered by Marketplace plans by roughly one third and the number of subsidy-
eligible individuals by half.139  Whether these individuals are healthier or sicker 
than the general Marketplace pool might vary from state to state.140  A variety of 
strategies have been proposed to mitigate a BHP’s impacts on the Marketplace, 
some of which the federal regulations could address.141  The proposed regulations 
seek specific comments on the contemplated approaches to risk adjustment and 
reinsurance intended to account for the health status of BHP enrollees.142  For 
example, the proposed rules describe a plan “to develop a risk adjustment factor to 
include in the [forthcoming] BHP funding methodology rather than include BHP in 
the individual market risk pool.”143  This is in contrast to an approach that would 
include the BHP population in the individual market for purposes of risk 
adjustment calculation.144  With any assessment, though, the number of enrollees is 
critical. 
As the Marketplaces open, there is increasing uncertainty about how many 
people will sign up and the characteristics of the resulting risk pool, particularly in 
states that have resisted ACA implementation and defaulted to federally run 
 
 136. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 8 (noting the BHP could reduce Marketplace 
participation by as much as one third, potentially impacting risk profile of Marketplace enrollees 
and weakening Marketplace viability). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 4 (stating that BHP federal funding is tied to enrollee premiums and cost-sharing 
subsidies the enrollees would have qualified for had they decided to purchase insurance in the 
Marketplace). 
 139. Id. at 8 
 140. See, e.g., Buettgens & Carroll, supra note 116, at 25 (finding that Washington’s BHP 
population would be older than the same cohort in other states).  See Day, supra note 117, at 3–5 
(detailing the uncertainty of the insurance risk profile of individuals who would enroll in the BHP, 
and explaining the benefits to the Marketplace and detriments to the BHP if the members of the 
BHP are less healthy than individuals in the Marketplace). 
 141. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 9–10 (proposing various options, including those 
that would combine the BHP and the individual market into a single risk pool, and options which 
would “include the BHP in the risk adjustment and reinsurance systems used in the Exchange”). 
 142. Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,134 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  
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Marketplaces.145  Will enrollees be young enough, healthy enough, male enough?  
It is not clear how the various incentives and penalties will play out.  In April 2013, 
six months before the Marketplaces’ opening, a significant percentage of 
Americans were either unsure if the ACA was even still on the books or sure that it 
was not.146  With this level of misinformation, it will be a challenge to educate the 
uninsured about the Marketplaces and subsidies and to get a sufficient number of 
healthy people into these insurance pools.  Even in states committed to robust 
Marketplaces from the outset, expected enrollment numbers are a moving target 
and may continue to be for some time.147  This current reality certainly complicates 
BHP modeling.  
One impetus for the interest in a BHP or a related option to address low-
income Marketplace shoppers is concern about the “bronze trap.”148  The concern is 
that low-income people might buy a bronze-level health insurance plan (as opposed 
to a silver, gold or platinum one) because of its comparatively low monthly 
premium, and then not be able to pay the associated higher cost-sharing.149  The co-
pays, co-insurance, and deductibles might then go unpaid, a problem for insurers 
and providers.  This “bronze trap” effect could be potentially significant.  Going 
forward, it will be important to track cost-sharing challenges related to the various 
plan levels.  
The structure of the federal tax subsidies to be offered on the Marketplaces 
exacerbates this concern.  The premium-support subsidies are pegged at the second-
 
 145. See Sarah Kliff, For Obamacare, Four More (Uncertain) Years, WONKBLOG (Jan. 21, 
2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/21/for-obamacare-four-more-
uncertain-years/ (discussing possibility of lower enrollment rates in states, such as Oklahoma, that 
are defaulting to the federally facilitated Marketplace and otherwise resisting the law, compared to 
states running their own Marketplaces and otherwise supporting ACA implementation).  More 
than half the states are not running their own Marketplaces in the first year of the program, and are 
instead defaulting to a federally facilitated Marketplace or a partnership model.  See State 
Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Marketplaces, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 28, 2013), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-exchanges/#  
 146. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: April 2013, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 18-21, 
2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-april-2013/ (asking 
American’s to describe their understanding of the current status of the health care law as one of 
the following: “It is still the law of the land and is being implemented” (59%), “It has been 
overturned by the Supreme Court and is no longer law” (7%), “It has been repealed by Congress 
and is no longer law (12%), or “Don’t know/Refused” (23%)).  
 147. See generally Kelly Kennedy, States Predict More Insurance Customers, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 20, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/09/19/health-care-law-
uninsured-estimates-obama/2671489/ (discussing enrollment predictions in the state-run 
Marketplaces). 
 148. Kelsey McCowan, How to Make Sure Health Reform Offers Affordable Insurance to all 
Low Income Families, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_basic_facts_heilman_ob_solving_h
ealthcre_reforms_affordability_problem_1.pdf. 
 149. See id. (explaining that the low premiums of bronze plans are desirable to families with 
“modest incomes,” but  might result in the family delaying or foregoing medical care because of 
the associated high copayments and deductibles). 
	   	  
2014] MIND THE GAP 121 
lowest cost silver plan and may be used to purchase any of the plans (so that the 
subsidy would go further if applied towards a bronze-level premium than if applied 
to a platinum-level premium).150  The other type of subsidy is a sliding-scale cost-
sharing subsidy available to Marketplace shoppers with incomes between 100% 
and 250% FPL.151  This is in addition to the premium subsidy and is intended to 
help defray the burden of co-pays, co-insurance and deductibles.152  This subsidy, 
however, is available only for those enrolled in silver plans.  It is not available to 
someone who purchases a bronze plan.153  This is one of the many seemingly small 
details of the ACA’s access provisions that can have a big practical impact.   
D.  How Would the BHP Federal Funding Compare to the  
States’ Costs for the Program? 
A motivating idea for this state option is that it would be operated using 
federal dollars, so that a state would not be out many or any of its funds, and the 
federal government would save money (compared to what it otherwise would have 
spent).154  And, of course, that more low-income people would get better coverage.  
To plan, particularly in times of strained state budgets, states need some certainty 
about how the federal funding will be calculated, how any reconciliation would 
work, and the timing of funding decisions.155  The Kaiser report provides an 
extensive consideration of the variables with alternate scenarios.156  The funding 
calculus is a moving target, partly because it is tied to the cost of premiums and 
cost-sharing within the Marketplace;157 these numbers will become more solid as 
 
 150. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,382 (May 23, 2012) 
(codified at 26 C.F.R §1.36B(b)(3)(B)(2012)); see also January Angeles, Making Health Care 
More Affordable: The New Premium and Cost-Sharing Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (Apr. 3, 2013), https://law.blackboard.umaryland.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-386529-dt-
content-rid-
1370516_1/courses/201309.96535.law.543D/CBPP%20Premium%20and%20Cost%20Sharing.pd
f (explaining that an individual may use their premium tax credit to purchase a more expensive 
gold or platinum plan, but the individual will have to pay the difference between the premium 
credit and the more expensive plan). 
 151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2012)).  
 152. BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & ANNIE L. MACH, CONGRESS. RESEARCH SERV., R42663, 
HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT (ACA), at 9 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42663.pdf. 
 153. Id. at 26; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(1)(B)(Supp. V 2012).  
 154. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 11–17 (explaining that while federal funding may 
cover the entire BHP program, states are concerned that the federal funding available will be 
insufficient, and states are attempting to “minimize the risk of inadequate federal funding” 
through a variety of strategies and estimations about the program’s anticipated costs). 
 155. See id. at 11–15 (discussing the risks to states implementing the BHP, should federal 
funding prove to be insufficient, specifically in regards to the mechanism for implementing annual 
financing reconciliation.).  
 156. Id.  
 157. See id. at 13–15 (discussing how cost-sharing subsidies will be tied to factors that must be 
adjusted for each enrollee, making it difficult to predict the cost of the premium tax credits and 
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coverage begins.  In addition, there are some statutory ambiguities,158 and a number 
of regulatory choices to be made about how the funds are calculated, distributed, 
and reconciled.159  The proposed rule sets forth a variety of factors to be used in 
calculating the payments to participating states,160 with specific details on payment 
to be issued later.161  
Furthermore, the state’s costs to run the program are bound up with its 
choices of the benefits covered, the reimbursement rates paid to providers, and the 
level of cost-sharing imposed on beneficiaries.162  All of these are variable.163  The 
Urban Institute modeling for Washington State concluded that a BHP “would likely 
be feasible,” covering more people, at significantly lower cost to them, and with 
payments to providers potentially one third higher than payments within 
Medicaid.164  The report cautions, however, that there are several “sources of 
uncertainty” related to the funding and that its modeling required a number of 
budgetary assumptions.165 
In states that had precursor programs, the administrative complexities of 
setting up the program, contracting with plans, and coordinating across the 
coverage continuum could certainly be less daunting.  Program scaffolding, popular 
recognition, and historic support, as are found with Washington’s precursor 
program, could facilitate transition to the related BHP.166  The ease of such a 
transition depends on a number of factors, including similarities of the two 
 
cost-sharing subsidies, which equates to the amount of funding the states receive from the federal 
government). 
 158. For example, the statute is not clear whether the state is to receive 100% or 95% of the 
cost-sharing funds.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18051((3)(a)(i) (Supp. V 2012) (“95 percent of the premium 
tax credits . . . and the cost-sharing reductions”).  The proposed rules interpret this as meaning 
95% of the cost-sharing funds. Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,133 (proposed 
Sept. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 600.605(a)(2)) (“We have carefully considered this 
issue, and have interpreted the statute to read that the payment amount equals 95 percent of the 
cost-sharing reductions”). 
 159. See Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59122, 59133-59134 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 600.605(a)(2)) (discussing other proposed methods for determining 
elements of BHP payment of federal funding to the States). 
 160. Id. at 59,133–34. 
 161. Id. at 59,123 (“ details on payment . . . will be issued separately.”). 
 162. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 16–17 (discussing state flexibility to set consumer 
premiums and cost-sharing, as well as the provider network and reimbursement rates, giving them 
some control over the revenue calculation that will impact costs). 
 163. See id. at 17. 
 164. Buettgens & Carroll, supra note 116, at 24–25. 
 165. See id. at 25 (explaining various programmatic uncertainties tied to enrollment and cost). 
 166. See id. at 6–7 ( suggesting that Washington could alter its Section 1115 waiver to continue 
eligibility for certain populations and that this option “may not be difficult to administer”); see 
also Angeles, supra note 150, at 8 (explaining how a state that already uses managed care 
organizations to provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries could build on that infrastructure for 
its BHP). 
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programs, their size and characteristics of the coverage networks.167  The regulatory 
delay, of course, undercuts the transitional value of precursor programs.168 
States have a variety of potential options that can be viewed as both 
placeholders pending BHP regulatory analysis, and also as alternatives in their own 
right.169  They share many of the BHP’s goals and also its challenges.  They also 
share its uncertainty because guidance remained sketchy even as 2014 
approached.170  The Administration has expressed a willingness to work with 
interested states to “identify similar flexibilities in coverage systems.”171  
One state working with the federal government on a placeholder option is 
Minnesota.172 Minnesota’s legislature decided to continue its precursor program of 
state-subsidized insurance as a vehicle for the BHP.173  Thus, MinnesotaCare is 
expected to continue with state funding (and matching federal funding tied to 
Medicaid) through 2014.174  At that point, the program is expected to transition to a 
 
 167. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 6–7 (explaining that while states may benefit from 
utilizing an already established Medicaid managed care program as a “delivery system” for the 
BHP, often Medicaid plans have narrower networks of providers, and the lower reimbursement 
rate for Medicaid services may not attract and sustain “robust provider networks” for the BHP). 
 168. See id. at 8 (explaining the financial risk that states run if they build a BHP on a non-
capitated delivery model before receiving final federal guidance); Paul Demko, State Rolls Out 
MinnesotaCare 2.0, POLITICS IN MINN. (June 19, 2013), available at 
http://politicsinminnesota.com/2013/06/state-rolls-out-minnesotacare-2-0/ (discussing how the 
state is attempting to bring its established MinnesotaCare plan in line with the federal guidelines, 
even though the final rules for the BHP will not be issued until 2015). 
 169. See infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text (discussing the decision by Minnesota to 
continue funding its MinnesotaCare program as a placeholder until the BHP plans are federally 
funded in 2015). 
 170. See Demko, supra note 168 (discussing Minnesota’s decision to continue funding their 
state program MinnesotaCare until federal funding is available in 2015, while making reforms to 
the plan in “anticipation of what are likely BHP requirements”). 
 171. Medicaid and CHIP FAQs: The Basic Health Program, supra note 98; see also 
Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS. at 6–7 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources 
/Files/Downloads/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf (explaining the government’s willingness to 
work with states who wish to implement a Marketplace “bridge” plan offered  by a managed care 
organization that also offers a state Medicaid plan). These “bridge” plans would only be available 
to a limited population that is transitioning from Medicaid/CHIP to private insurance.  Frequently 
Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS. at 6–7 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/ 
Files/Downloads/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf.  
 172. See M.S.A § 256L.02(5)) (seeking “federal approval to implement MinnesotaCare” as a 
BHP); see also Catharine Richert, Affordable Care Act Has Unique Proving Ground in 
Minnesota, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web 
/2013/07/09/health/affordable-care-act-minnesota-proving-ground (discussing the state of 
Minnesota’s decision to fund MinnesotaCare, the state’s basic health program, until 2015 when 
federal funding will become available). 
 173. See Richert, supra note 172 (discussing Minnesota’s legislature decision to continue fund 
MinnesotaCare until BHP funding becomes available in 2015). 
 174. Id.; see also MINN. HUMAN SERVS., 2014–15 BIENNIAL BUDGET; ACA: NEW 
MINNESOTACARE-NEW, last accessed Oct. 18, 2013, available at http://mn.gov/dhs/images/CI-
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BHP, with the broader federal funding.175  This transition will be a helpful model 
for other interested states. 
The Administration specifically indicated that a “bridge option” might gain 
approval.176 This idea can be viewed as expanding Medicaid upwards into the 
Marketplace territory.177  A state could designate one or more of its Medicaid 
managed care plans as QHPs at the silver coverage level on the Marketplace.178  
These would be available “on a limited-enrollment basis to certain populations.”179  
A “narrow bridge” would apply to individuals transitioning from Medicaid or 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage to the Marketplace.180  They 
would be eligible for the QHP bridge plan that would presumably include the same 
provider network and low cost-sharing obligations.181  In addition, in low-income 
families where only some members (likely young children or pregnant women) 
qualified for Medicaid or CHIP, this arrangement possibly could be designed to 
allow the entire family to be on the same insurance plan.182   
This sort of “one card option”183 ideally would promote continuity of 
coverage and its attendant health benefits.  It is unclear how this type of bridge 
option would impact the rest of a state’s Marketplace.  For example, the ACA’s 
Marketplace framework assumes that all the plans offered are available to all 
eligible shoppers, and this model would set aside a low-cost plan as available only 
 
95_HC75_ACA_New_MinnesotaCare_Demo_Waiver.pdf; see also Demko, supra note 168 
(discussing that MinnesotaCare costs are currently shared almost evenly between state and federal 
funding, however in 2015 the federal government will likely pay 85% of the cost).  
 175. Richert, supra note 172.  
 176. See Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra 
note 171, at 6 (detailing the terms under which a Marketplace “may allow an issuer . . . to offer a 
qualified health plan as a Medicaid bridge plan”). 
 177. See id. (explaining that an individual can retain many qualities of his or her Medicaid 
coverage after transitioning into the Marketplace). 
 178. Id. at 6–7 (“In general, an Exchange may allow an issuer with a state Medicaid managed 
care organization contract to offer a qualified health plan as a Medicaid bridge plan . . . ”). 
 179. Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 
171, at 6. 
 180. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19 (discussing early versions of this potential option 
and related state proposals). 
 181. Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 
171; Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19.  
 182. Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 
171, at 6. 
 183. Id. 
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to some.184  Would that skew the available subsidies (which are pegged to the 
second least expensive plan in the silver category)?185  
Under some scenarios, this limited-enrollment QHP could potentially be 
expanded to become a “broad bridge” for all of those ineligible for Medicaid, 
otherwise eligible for subsidized coverage, and with incomes below 200% FPL.186  
This is, of course, the BHP population.187  The coverage structure and funding 
model would be different than under a BHP, though it would address similar 
concerns.188   
One idea emerging as an option to Medicaid expansion evinces the 
Administration’s willingness to consider a variety of coverage models in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s decision that made the Medicaid expansion optional.189  In 
states where lawmakers are resistant to expanding Medicaid, one possible approach 
that has been forwarded by a few of those states is a “premium assistance” 
model.190  This would use federal Medicaid expansion money (the federal matching 
funds for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees that begin at full cost in 2014 and then 
ratchet down to 90% in 2020 and beyond) to buy coverage on the Marketplace for 
those with incomes between 100% FPL and 138% FPL.191  In some ways this 
 
 184. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19 (explaining that former Medicaid beneficiaries 
could receive unique benefits in the Marketplace); see Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, 
Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 173, at 11 (explaining that when enrolling in a 
federally-facilitated Marketplace, consumers will be presented with all QHPs that they are eligible 
for, not the QHPs that might be best for them in particular).  
 185. Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19 (explaining that bridge plan premiums would not 
factor into the benchmark plan’s value, and since tax subsidies are based on the benchmark plan’s 
value, they would disproportionately favor bridge plan enrollees).   
 186. California is one of the states that actively pursued a bridge option.  See, e.g., Bridge 
Plan: A Strategy to Promote Continuity of Care & Affordability Through Contracts with Medi-Cal 
Managed Care Plans, COVERED CAL. 1 (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/	  
BoardMeetings/Documents/January17_2013/VI._B._Affordability-Continuity_of_Care_Options_ 
BRB.pdf (discussing legislation authorizing establishment of limited-enrollment QHPs, the 
impacts in California of a narrow and a broad bridge, and the unresolved questions). 
 187. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that BHPs apply to those whose 
income is between 139% and 200% of the FPL).  
 188. Compare id. (noting that the BHP “allows states to use federal tax subsidy dollars to offer 
subsidized coverage for individuals” to promote “continuity among plans and providers as . . . 
income fluctuates above and below Medicaid levels.”) with Frequently Asked Questions on 
Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 173, at 6 (stating that bridges treat 
Medicaid managed care plans as private QHPs, and they are “intended to promote continuity of 
coverage between Medicaid or CHIP and the Exchange.”).  
 189. Julie Piotrowski, Health Policy Brief: Premium Assistance in Medicaid, HEALTH AFF. 1 
(June 6, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_94.pdf 
(explaining that although states now have the option not to expand Medicaid, the potential for 
negative consequences is encouraging them to consider alternatives such as the premium 
assistance model).  This option is a possibility because the Marketplace subsidies begin at 100% 
FPL rather than the Medicaid level of 138%.  As discussed at supra note 62, this subsidy level 
might be a drafting error.  Supra, note 62 and accompanying text.  
 190. Piotrowski, supra note 189, at 1. 
 191. See id. at 2. 
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“Private Option” Medicaid model can be viewed as expanding the Marketplace 
down into Medicaid.192  The Arkansas legislature endorsed this approach and the 
state pursued it with federal regulators under a possible demonstration waiver.193  
Proponents suggest that it would allow more people to be covered by insurance as 
compared to a non-expansion, support the private insurance market, and reduce 
churn as compared to a standard Medicaid expansion.194   
One big hurdle for this premium assistance idea is cost, as private insurance is 
generally substantially more expensive than Medicaid coverage,195 and a state 
interested in this approach must show that it is cost-effective compared to enrolling 
the population in Medicaid.196  The Congressional Budget Office determined that 
covering each beneficiary through a Marketplace plan would, on average, be about 
50% more expensive compared to Medicaid coverage.197  Arkansas estimates that 
in its state the cost differential would be much less, closer to 13% or 14%.198  
Coverage through the Marketplace plans would need to be consistent with 
Medicaid requirements, including as to scope of benefits and cost-sharing 
restrictions, among other concerns.199  This Medicaid premium assistance idea is 
not the BHP, and not really a BHP alternative or placeholder.  It does, however, 
reinforce the potential role of state innovation and the importance of attention to 
options for low income people along the coverage continuum. 
 
 
 
 192. See id. at 2, 3 (noting that the premium approach utilizes funds traditionally appropriated 
for Medicaid to purchase private insurance for people traditionally covered by Medicaid). 
 193. Id. at 6 (“State health officials in Arkansas are aiming to submit their premium assistance 
waiver request in June . . .”); see also ARK. DEP’T HUMAN SERV., ARKANSAS DRAFT 1115 
WAIVER FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2013), https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/Download/general/ 
comment/InitialHCIWApp.doc (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (indicating the potential basis for the 
waiver). 
 194. See Piotrowski, supra note 189, at 2, 4–5 (explaining that full state implementation of 
Medicaid would have covered 16 million more people, and since states no longer have to expand 
Medicaid, the premium approach may fill that gap in states that choose not to expand Medicaid; 
additionally, the premium approach may remove “any potential coverage gaps created when 
someone’s income rises and they become ineligible for Medicaid.”).   
 195. See id. at 4 (reporting that “[t]he Congressional Budget Office determined that covering 
each recipient through an exchange will, on average, cost the federal government an additional 
$9,000 per year versus $6,000 through the regular Medicaid delivery system.”).   
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 3 (explaining that HHS requires premium plans to be comparable to Medicaid in 
terms of benefits and cost-sharing). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Effectively implementing the ACA’s access provisions will be a challenging, 
on-going process, with state action at the forefront.200  As the expansion states work 
towards near universal coverage, they should pay close attention to the practical 
challenges faced by those in the income bands around the transition from Medicaid 
to Marketplace.201  It is in this transition, this gap, that the benefits of health care 
continuity will face key affordability and network challenges.202  
If the ACA’s goal is not merely access to health insurance, but more broadly 
access to health care, and more broadly still, good health, then states need to mind 
the gap.  As people, by virtue of income or family composition changes, move from 
one insurance platform to another, they need sure footing.203  The ACA’s BHP 
might be able to provide that footing.204  We will not know, though, until the 
federal regulations take shape and more solid answers emerge as to the program’s 
possible impacts on low-income people, on the Marketplaces, and on state budgets.   
Whether or not many states ultimately pursue a BHP, consideration of this 
option draws attention to insurance affordability and care continuity challenges.  
These challenges are particularly acute for those with low incomes, but they 
fundamentally animate all aspects of the ACA with its goals of increasing 
coverage, reducing costs, and improving quality across the coverage continuum as 
broadly conceived.205  
 
 
 200. See supra Part III (explaining that states will be the pioneers in implementing and 
addressing problems with the ACA). 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 70–76 (explaining the disruptive churn and cost 
variations faced by those who fluctuate between Medicaid and private insurance). 
 202. See supra notes 71–73, 76 (explaining the “affordability cliff” and potential network 
discontinuity between Medicaid and Marketplace plans). 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 123–25 (detailing the prevalence and effects of 
churn). 
 204. See supra Part IV (assessing the potential for BHPs to promote affordability and 
continuity while reducing churn). 
 205. See supra Part I (summarizing the goals of the ACA). 
